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ABSTRACT 
Recent empirical papers report a declining trend in the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of acquirers 
during an M&A program. Does this necessarily imply that acquiring CEOs are infected by hubris and are 
not learning from previous mistakes?  We first confirm the existence of this declining trend on average.  
However, we find a positive CAR trend for CEOs likely to be infected by hubris, which is significantly 
different from the negative trend found for CEOs who are more likely to be rational.  We also explore the 
time between successive deals and find empirical evidence to suggest that many CEOs learn substantially 
during acquisition programs. 
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Recent empirical papers report a declining trend in cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of 
acquiring firms during merger and acquisition (M&A) programs. Fuller et al. (2002), analyzing 
3,135 successful deals during the nineties in the US, report an average acquirer CAR of 2.74% for 
the first acquisition, declining to 0.52% for the fifth and successive acquisition. Similar results, 
some even more dramatic, are reported in Billett and Qian (2005), Croci (2005), Conn et al. 
(2005), (for UK M&As), Ismail (2006) and Ahern (2006). The question is no longer whether this 
phenomenon is real or robust. The empirical procedures in the above-cited papers are sound and 
we replicate similar results here. But how should this pattern be interpreted? Is the declining trend 
a sign of growing hubris with repetitive acquisitions, as is often alleged in these papers
1
?  Or 
could it be consistent with rational CEO learning?   
 
The question is important. The management literature argues that acquirers can benefit greatly 
from learning (Hayward, 2002; Harding and Rovit, 2004). Hayward (2002) even identifies the 
conditions allowing (organizational) learning: (i) deals not too close together nor too far apart in 
time, (ii) deals not too similar nor different in terms of businesses, and (iii) decision-makers with 
appropriate economic incentives. In the economic and finance literature also, there is a long 
tradition of considering learning as a key feature of decision making (see, inter alia,  Grossman et 
al., 1977, Zeira, 1987; Rob, 1991; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994;  Bernardo and Chowdhry, 
2002; Berk et al., 2004). CEO decision makers who exhibit growing hubris contradict these ideas. 
It would also raise doubt about the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms, which would 
seem unable to forestall value-destroying decisions and unable to select CEOs who act rationally 
in behalf of shareholders.  
 
The direct impact of CEOs on the M&A decisions and their risk aversion are two stylized features 
examined in previous papers (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Cai and Vijh (forthcoming 
Journal of Finance)). Aktas et al. (2006) – ADR hereafter – derive a theoretical model of 
decision making for both rational and hubris-infected CEOs.  In their formal analysis, the CEO 
has to value a potential acquisition before bidding. During this initial valuation stage, the CEO 
faces a tradeoff between over-evaluation, which could lead ex-post to disappointment and 
possible sanctions (such as dismissal), and under-valuation, which would make successful deal 
                                                   
1 Some these papers bear enlightening titles. Just to mention a few: “Are overconfident managers born or 
made? Evidence of self-attribution bias from frequent acquirers” (Billet and Quian (2005), “Why must all 
good things come to an end? The performance of multiple acquirers” (Conn et al. (2005)), “Will multiple 
acquirers ever learn? The US evidence from single versus multiple acquirers” (Ismail (2006)). 
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completion unlikely.  Financial markets are assumed (semi-strong) efficient, and their reactions to 
successive deal announcements are signals sent to the CEO, who uses them  to update his beliefs 
about potential synergies with targets. Hubris is defined as a form of cognitive bias, leading to 
over-estimated expected synergies (over-optimism) or to under-estimated synergy risk (over-
confidence).  
 
From the valuation tradeoff combined with learning and/or hubris, ADR draw implications about 
CEO bidding behavior and about ex-post observable prices, the announcement period CAR, and 
the time between successive deals (TBD). The theory delivers a set of empirically testable 
implications for rational and hubris infected CEOs. It implies that a declining CAR trend is NOT 
sufficient to imply growing hubris during M&A programs. Indeed, a declining CAR can be 
explained by several alternative phenomena (e.g., a shrinking investment opportunity set or 
increasing competition among acquirers in M&A waves). However, the combination of 
predictions about the CAR and the TBD is distinctly different for rational and hubris-infected 
CEOs within the ADR theory. 
 
In this paper, we subject the ADR theory to empirical test.  Our aim is to describe the dominant 
traits of the US CEO decision makers during M&A programs and to test whether the empirical 
predictions developed in ADR are supported by the facts.  We study a sample of 2,589 individual 
CEOs, spanning the 1992-2002 period. Among them, 1,235 have not made any acquisitions while 
1,424 have made at least one.  In the latter group, the average number of deals is 3.28, or 4,677 
deals in total.  
 
The key features of our empirical approach are: (i) as in Croci (2005), we focus on CEOs and not 
on firms because we believe that CEOs play a central role in M&A decisions.  Especially when 
dealing with hubris and learning, it seems sensible to focus on specific individual decision 
makers; (ii) we adapt our econometric methods to the natural panel structure of the data (tracking 
successive deals done by a given CEO); (iii) we investigate the determinants of the TBD, which 
is, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirical evidence about this attribute of M&A 
programs; (iv) using a two-step procedure similar to Leschinskii and Zollo (2004) and Gaspar et 
al. (2005), we explicitly control for potential endogenous sample selection biases.  
 
Our first step is to corroborate the previously reported declining CAR pattern from deal to deal. 
Then, using the ADR model‟s predictions, we provide a set of new results. Our univariate 
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analyses show that (i) during M&A programs, CEOs, firms and deal profiles change (this is not 
necessarily a surprise but it verifies that repetitive acquirers are not the same as one time 
acquirers); (ii) although the CAR declines from deal to deal on average, it increases for hubris-
infected CEOs;
2
 (iii) as predicted by the ADR model, TBD decreases from deal to deal but again 
there are differences between rational and hubris-infected CEOs.  
 
Multivariate analyses deliver two principal results: 
- (i) controlling for panel data and endogenous sample selection, while CARs decline on average 
during M&A programs, for hubris-infected CEOs, they increase and the difference is 
statistically significant.  This result is robust to the inclusion of many control variables and to 
alternate hubris proxies; 
- (ii) TBD decreases from deal to deal both on average and for hubris-infected CEOs, though it is 
almost flat for the latter.  This result is robust to the inclusion of many control variables. We 
also uncover some interesting relations between CEO remuneration and the evolution of TBD. 
 
The results generally support the ADR theory and its underlying learning hypothesis. In 
particular, the combination of a declining average CAR, an increasing CAR for hubris-infected 
CEOs, and a declining average TBD, are direct predictions of the theory.  However, in conflict 
with the theory‟s predictions, we do not find an increasing TBD for hubris-infected CEOs.  But 
the nearly flat TBD trend for these CEOs and its statistically significant difference from the TBD 
trend for rational CEOs points in the right direction (especially considering the inherently noisy 
nature of hubris proxies and the errors-in-variables problem pointed out in ADR). Finally, we find 
an increasing CAR from deal to deal for public targets.  This is incompatible with a shrinking 
investment opportunity set. Overall, the results suggest that average CEO behavior is 
characterized by learning and that the effects of learning seem to be present even when a CEO is 
initially infected by hubris. 
 
The first section of the paper briefly reviews various explanations of the CAR pattern from deal 
to deal in M&A programs including the testable implications of the ADR theory. Section II 
describes our sample, variables and empirical methods. Section III is devoted to a preliminary set 
of univariate tests while Section IV provides multivariate tests.  The final section summarizes and 
concludes. 
                                                   
2 Section II explains the hubris measure. 
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I. M&A Programs and Value Creation 
A. CAR Patterns during M&A Programs 
Schipper and Thompson (1983) are among the first to emphasize the repetitive nature of 
acquisitions. They show that acquisition program announcements are value creating.
3
 This 
suggests that market reactions to subsequent deal announcements do not represent the full value 
created, but are merely revisions of previous investor anticipations. Under this acquisition 
program anticipation hypothesis, one should observe a significant market reaction around either 
an acquisition program announcement or a surprise first deal announcement (i.e., a deal 
announcement that is not preceded by a program announcement.)  However, for subsequent 
announcements, only the unanticipated information revealed at that time should impact stock 
market prices. This would imply a CAR profile characterized by a large initial spike, followed by 
more modest successive CARs randomly distributed around zero (assuming that financial markets 
do not make systematically biased mistakes.) Hence, the acquisition program anticipation 
hypothesis does not predict a declining CAR trend in successive deals. 
 
Other contributions focus on CEO hubris as a key psychological factor in acquisitions. 
Referencing Roll (1986), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Malmendier and Tate (2006), Moeller et al. 
(2005), among others, interpret the empirical evidence to indicate hubris; the evidence includes 
long term post acquisition under-performance, CEO option exercise patterns, and value-
destroying deals.  Fuller et al (2002), Billett and Qian (2005), Conn et al. (2005), Croci (2005), 
Ismail (2006) and Ahern (2006) all find a declining trend in the CAR during M&A programs. 
This clear empirical regularity is also interpreted as a sign of hubris (the implicit assumption 
being that hubris is growing from deal to deal), except by Croci (2005) and Ahern (2006).  Using 
performance persistence measures borrowed from the performance attribution literature, Croci 
(2005) shows that neither performance persistence (good deals following good deals) nor 
performance reversals (bad deals following good deals) are statistically significant.  He concludes 
that CEOs seem neither to possess superior target picking skills nor to be systematically 
overconfident. Ahern (2006) focuses on information anticipation and organizational learning. He 
argues that CARs incorporate investor anticipations about learning by acquirers during M&A 
programs, so information anticipation must be controlled to obtain valid empirical tests (in the 
                                                   
3 Conflicting evidence however exist in the literature (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 1983; Ahern, 2006). 
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presence of learning.)  The author also presents indirect evidence of learning at the organizational 
level. 
 
Klasa and Stegemoller (forthcoming Financial Management) present a new argument. They study 
the relation between growth opportunities and M&A sequences made by individual bidders. The 
authors posit that M&A sequences begin in response to an expansion of the investment 
opportunity set and end when it is finally exhausted. The CAR trend observed ex-post would 
therefore reflect the declining investment opportunity set rather than hubris-infected CEOs.  
While the authors provide empirical support for their argument, proxies used to measure the 
investment opportunity set are subject to some question. 
 
The time between successive deals (TBD) has not been investigated previously, perhaps owing to 
a lack of any theoretical predictions about what TBD pattern should be observed, if any.  Indeed, 
neither the acquisition program anticipation hypothesis, nor the hubris hypothesis nor the time-
varying investment opportunity set hypothesis, predict a TBD pattern during M&A programs. 
 
So, a declining CAR in successive deals is compatible with different arguments, growing hubris 
and a shrinking investment opportunity, to mention only two. More specific theoretical 
predictions are needed to test empirically for the presence (or absence) of learning.  
 
B. The ADR Model 
In Aktas et al. (2006) (ADR) an under-diversified risk-averse CEO competes in market for 
acquisitions.  The CEO first values potential synergies with a possible target and then engages 
attempts to buy it either through competitive bidding or bargaining.  
 
The CEO’s reservation valuation. Potential synergies with the target at the tth deal of the 
acquisition program are denoted ts . They are uncertain and follow a Gaussian distribution 
),(~ 2sst Ns  .  Since s  and 
2
s  are assumed to be constant over time, the ADR model‟s 
implications are not driven by variations in the investment opportunity set.   Rational CEOs know 
s  and hubris-infected CEOs over-estimate synergies at the beginning of the M&A program 
( ss  1,ˆ , where ^ refers to CEO‟s perceptions and 1 to the first deal within the M&A 
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sequence
4
). When valuating the potential synergies, the CEO maximizes his own utility function. 
He faces a conundrum: if his valuation and the offering price are too low the takeover attempt 
will probably fail; but if the valuation is too high and the takeover succeeds, the CEO risks some 
form of penalty because of disappointing synergies relative to the price paid.  Let tB  denote the 
CEO‟s risk-adjusted bonus in case of deal completion and successful implementation (the CEO 
stays in place) and let tL  denote the risk-adjusted penalty imposed on the CEO when synergies 
are disappointing. Learning enters the model as a Bayesian inference process. Market reactions to 
past deal announcements are signals (denoted t ) received by the CEO, helping him to better 
assess potential synergies with targets. Signals are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution 
),(~ 2 st N . Note that signals are centered on true expected synergies. This is tantamount 
to an assumption that financial markets are efficient; hence, none of the ADR model‟s 
implications are due to misvaluation by investors. The CEO has some perception of the risk 
associated with synergies (
2ˆ
t ) and, from deal to deal, updates this perception using market 
signals. Using classical conjugate prior results, 
2ˆ
t  can be written as: 
 
22
0,
2
,
1
)1(
ˆ
1
ˆ
1

 t
sts
     (1) 
 
In words, 
2ˆ
t declines with the number of previous deals completed by the individual CEO; since 
each deal generates another market signal.  Since the CEO is risk averse, the risk-adjusted 
expected bonus tB  is a negative function of 
2ˆ
t  ( 0ˆ
2  ttB  ) learning increases the risk-
adjusted expected bonus tB  (everything else kept constant).
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4 As pointed out in ADR, a CEO‟s initial perception may be biased in two respects: over-optimism about 
expected synergies, (the case that we deal with here), or over-confidence (under-assessment of the risks of 
synergies.)  We limit the analysis here to over-optimism since either cognitive bias leads to the same 
empirical predictions. 
5 In ADR, the authors assume a linear wage contract in the form of 
tT sbMVB
~  where B is a cash bonus, b 
is a variable component, MVT is the market value of the target, ts
~  denotes the random synergies and γ is the 
usual risk aversion coefficient. Using a Taylor series approximation, the authors show that the expected risk 
adjusted bonus takes the form )ˆ
2
)(
2
( 2,
222
tsTsTsT MVbbMVBbMVB 
  , which is clearly a 
negative function of 2ˆ
t . 
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The CEO‟s reservation value (the maximum price he is willing to pay) is obtained by expected 
utility maximization. Under a set of assumptions including uniform distributions for the 
probability of deal completion and the probability of penalty for over-payment), the reservation 
value, v*, is determined by the following equation 
LB
B
VV
Vv
t
t






2
1*
,    (2) 
where, V
–
 corresponds to  the target‟s current market value, and V+ corresponds to a valuation 
level for which the takeover attempt will succeed with certainty but the CEO will be fired because 
of over-payment. In words, the CEO‟s reservation value increases with the risk-adjusted expected 
bonus, ( 0*  tBv ). 
 
Bids, prices, CAR and TBD. M&A operations have varied forms.  Direct takeovers receive the 
most notoriety, but they represent only a fraction of all acquisitions (see Andrade et al., 2001)); 
for them ascending auctions are typically used to model the competition among acquirers.  
Private acquisitions orchestrated by financial intermediaries (a significant percentage of all 
acquisitions according to Boone and Mulherin (forthcoming, Journal of Finance)) seem closer to 
first-price sealed bid auctions (Hansen, 2001).  Direct bargaining between acquirer and target is 
also frequent.  For each of the above three forms, given (a) CEO risk aversion, (b) positive 
correlation of potential synergies across acquirers, (c) asymmetry across acquirers due to diverse 
prior experience, and (d) independent private valuations, the equilibrium bidding and pricing 
functions (respectively (.)  and (.)p ) are shown to be strictly increasing in the CEO‟s 
reservation value 
*v : 
 
0
)(
*
*



v
v
 and 0
))((
*
*



v
vp 
     (3) 
 
This implies that a higher acquisition price for a given level of synergies will result in a lower 
fraction of synergies being accrued by the acquirer: 
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On the other hand, a higher acquisition price brings a higher probability of success and, for a 
given number of transaction attempts by period, a lower TBD: 
 
   
0
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)(
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vpTBD
v
vpTBD 



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  (5) 
 
Empirical implications. Equations (4) and (5) allow ADR to derive a rich set of empirical 
predictions about the implications of learning during M&A programs. These are summarized in 
Figure 1. Panel A presents the results for rational CEOs. As learning progresses, rational CEOs 
improve their ability to forecast potential synergies. Consequently, they bid more aggressively 
with each successive deal, increasing the offering price. This increases the probability of doing 
deals (so TBD decreases) and increases the fraction of value creation conceded to target 
shareholders (so the acquirer‟s CAR also decreases)6.  These predictions depend on CEO risk 
aversion: more confidence about future synergies brings higher valuations.  
 
Since CEOs are potentially infected by hubris (see Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Ben-David et 
al. (2006)), it is also important to analyze potential implications of learning for hubris-infected 
CEOs (see Figure 1, Panels B and C). Initial bids should be either slightly value creating (the 
CEO over-bids but not enough to destroy value) or value destroying (the over-bidding is severe 
enough that the acquisition premium exceeds potential synergies).   However, market reactions to 
past deal announcements provide a lesson. CEOs infected with hubris learn and progressively 
reduce value destruction (the CAR trend is positive), by reducing their aggressiveness in the 
bidding process. This should also lead to an increase in TBD from deal to deal. The testable 
prediction of increasing CAR and TBD for hubris-infected CEOs is specific to the learning 
process underlying the ADR theory. 
 
Empirical tests of ADR predictions are exposed to significant pitfalls. One involves endogenous 
sample selection.  Completed deals involve only auction winners, who may either be more 
talented or be more hubris infected; this is exacerbated by a further survival bias since really 
badly-infected CEOs will probably be fired by shareholders. A second pitfall involves errors-in-
variables. CEOs who create value at the beginning of an M&A program, are a mix of both 
rational (Figure 1 – Panel A) and hubris-infected (Figure 1 – Panel C). But the empirical 
                                                   
6 This essentially implies that each successive deal is not completely anticipated. 
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predictions are conflicting: decreasing trends of both CAR and TBD for rational CEOs while 
increasing trends for hubris-infected CEOs. The mixture of rational and hubris-infected CEOs is 
thus likely to weaken the power of empirical tests.  A partial resolution is to use some sort of 
instrumental variable (or proxy) allowing hubris-infected CEO identification, but this inevitably 
has its own errors-in-variable problem. The empirical methods we adopt attempt to deal 
systematically with these issues. 
II. Data and Empirical Methods 
A. Sample Constitution 
To understand CEO behavior during M&A programs, we need to follow their successive 
decisions over an extended time period. Our sample of CEOs is extracted from Compustat 
ExecuComp. This database provides information about CEO compensation essential for testing 
predictions of the ADR model. The ExecuComp database starts in 1992. In order to observe the 
full history of each CEO‟s successive decisions, we therefore study only CEOs hired in 1992 and 
later. The data base includes 2,589 CEOs making decisions between 1992 and 2002.  These 2,589 
persons have been CEOs of 1,740 different firms. So some (70) have been CEOs of more than 
one firm. Our analysis focuses on ‘CEO-Firm’ couples (an individual CEO at a particular firm), 
referenced hereafter under the generic term of CEO. Table 1 – Panel A presents the sample 
evolution through time. The sample increases through time and is sizeable by the mid-nineties.  
 
To identify M&A operations undertaken by these CEOs, we rely on the Thomson SDC database. 
Since we want to control for an acquisition program effect (more on this in Section II.B), we 
collect deals beginning in 1990.  Our deal selection criteria are as follows: US listed acquirers, all 
targets (US and non-US, listed and non-listed), completed deals and percentage of shares held 
before the deal less than 50%.  To ease the comparison of our results with previously published 
ones, we present two samples: the ‘Full Sample’, which includes all deals of at least one million 
dollars, and the ‘Big Sample’, which is restricted to deals larger than one hundred million dollars. 
The ‘Full Sample’ essentially mimics that used by Moeller et al. (2005) and it includes 28,662 
deals. The ‘Big Sample’ includes 6,108 deals and is closer to Fuller et al. (2002) or Billett and 
Qian (2005). Table 1 – Panel B and C present their evolutions through time. The end of the 
nineties merger wave is clearly apparent in both samples (in the number of deals and in their 
aggregate value). 
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An individual CEO‟s M&A decision history is built by matching the CEO sample with either the 
M&A ‘Full Sample’ or ‘Big Sample’, taking into account the CEO‟s period of activity reported 
by Compustat ExecuComp.  Table 2 – Panel A describes the matched samples. For the ‘Full 
Sample’ of M&As, 4,677 deals are matched to 1,424 CEOs. The average number of deals per 
CEO is 3.28.  For 1,235 CEOs, no deal has been identified.  For the ‘Big Sample’, 2,021 are 
matched, 872 CEOs have done at least one deal (with an average of 2.32 deals per CEO) and 
1,787 CEOs are classified as having done no deal. Table 2 – Panel B presents the number of 
CEOs having done at least a given number of deals. The results confirm that repetitive 
acquisitions are frequent (see Schipper and Thompson, 1983).  Our M&A decision history 
reconstruction possibly misses some deals since the Thomson SDC coverage is extensive but 
perhaps not exhaustive.  
 
We complement information provided by Compustat ExecuComp and Thomson SDC using the 
CRSP and Compustat databases. Data availability limits our final sample sizes, depending on the 
control variables used in various tests. We therefore systematically report the exact number of 
observations in each computation. We also have used data from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Ownership Reporting System to track acquirers that undertook insider 
trading. 
 
B. Variable Definitions 
Our main dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
7
 observed around the 
acquisition announcement date and the time between successive deals (TBD).
8
  To compute the 
CAR, daily abnormal returns are computed as in Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004; 
2005) using the Beta-one model, which subtracts the daily market portfolio return from the daily 
return of each company.  We use the daily equal weighted CRSP index as a proxy for the market 
portfolio. The standard market model (or any model that requires coefficient estimation) could be 
problematic due to repetitive acquisitions and concomitant overlapping observations.  The event-
window goes from day minus five to day plus five relative to the announcement date (the 
Thomson SDC announcement dates are known to be somewhat imprecise, which suggests that the 
event window should not be too narrow).  To form a cumulative average abnormal return, CAAR, 
we use equal weighting.  It has been feasible to compute the CAR for 25,845 out of the 28,662 
                                                   
7 ADR model also delivers predictions about bids and prices, so it would be interesting to investigate their 
determinants too.  But data availability constraints would drastically reduce the sample sizes. 
8 For the first deal, TBD is the time between the CEO hiring date and the first deal announcement date. 
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deals in the Full Sample.  The average CAR is 1.6% (t-stat of 18.6) and its median is 0.5%.  
These results are compatible with recent papers focusing on exhaustive M&A samples (see 
Moeller et al., 2004). 
 
For multivariate analyses, the main independent variable is the deal sequence number (SEQ), 
whose coefficient measures the time slope of the CAR or TBD during the M&A program.  
 
The existing literature suggests the inclusion of three categories of control variables.  A brief 
summary follows and a detailed description can be found in the Appendix.  
- CEO specific: the hiring and departure dates determine the activity period. Compustat 
ExecuComp provides CEO remuneration variables (annual base salary, the variable component 
of salary relative to the base salary, share holdings). These are important as controls because 
CEO remuneration is known to influence acquisition decisions (Hubbard and Palia, 1995; Datta 
et al., 2001; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004).  Age and gender might be related to CEO risk 
aversion and but are frankly included out of sheer curiosity.  
- Deal specific: the announcement date (from Thomson SDC), the deal size (see among many 
others Moeller et al. (2005)), the percentage acquired and the toehold (Schwert, 2000; Betton 
and Eckbo, 2000), the payment method (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Huang and Walkling, 1987; 
Hansen, 1987; Martin, 1996; Faccio and Masulis, 2005), the attitude (hostile versus friendly 
deals, as reported by Thomson SDC) and the number of bidders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), the 
strategic fit between the bidder and the target (Servaes, 1996), the target‟s private/public status 
(Fuller et al., 2002) and a proxy for the target‟s size (based on the percentage acquired and the 
deal size).
9
 
- Firm specific: following previous research, these are bidder characteristics, including the 
bidder‟s past performance (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), market anticipation effects (Palepu, 
1986), the acquisition program effect (see a.o. Schipper and Thompson, 1983; Malatesta and 
Thompson, 1985), several variables to control for industry determinants, including the sector 
concentration, the number and value of transactions in the industry (see, e.g., Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Harford, 2005), the extent of the acquirer‟s 
diversification (using information provided by the Compustat Segment database), the acquirer‟s 
size (Moeller et al., 2004) and several acquirer financial ratios (cash-flow/total assets, leverage, 
                                                   
9 Since this proxy is based on the deal transaction price, it includes the premium paid by the bidder. 
Consequently, this control variable has been excluded from the set of CAR determinants, being clearly 
endogenous with respect to the market reaction around the deal announcement. 
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free cash-flow, growth of assets, growth of sales, liquidity, market to book, price-earning, 
return on equity and Tobin‟s q). 
Since most targets are not listed, target controls are rather limited.  
C. Methods 
Econometric details will be described in Section III (univariate analyses) and Section IV 
(multivariate analyses).  However, it is useful at this point to explain some generic choices 
underlying the empirical work. 
C.1. Timing 
Determinants of CEO behavior (base salary, variable component of the salary,…) are updated to 
their values at the end of the year before each acquisition; their evolution could be due (at least 
partially) to the succession of deals (Datta et al., 2001; Rosen, 2004). Firm specific financial 
ratios and industry determinants are all calculated at the end of the year before the acquisition 
announcement (to avoid any feedback effects.)  
 C.2. Industry Classification 
Instead of using SIC industry codes, which are subject to considerable criticism (see Kahle and 
Walkling,1996), we employ the 48 Fama-French classifications, exploiting the SIC to Industry 
Codes conversion table provided on Ken French‟ Web site10 and historical SIC codes provided in 
the CRSP Database. This brings some balance among the number of industries, the number of 
firms within each industry and the homogeneity of intra-industry economic activity. These are 
important concerns when controlling for industry related determinants of market reactions to 
M&A announcements. 
C.3. Hubris Proxy 
Variable Definition. Finding a robust proxy for hubris is a real challenge.  Because our empirical 
investigation is based on the ADR model, a good proxy should be close to the definition of hubris 
adopted in that model, which is a cognitive bias, leading either to over-optimism or over-
confidence. The most direct consequence is over-bidding, leading in extreme cases to value 
                                                   
10 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
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destruction for the bidder shareholders at deal announcement. Our hubris proxy is based on this 
implication.  Previous research, however (see Fuller et al. (2002) has found that a major 
determinant of the acquirer‟s CAR is the target‟s status, public versus private.  Consequently the 
CARs of firms acquiring public targets cannot be directly compared to the CARs of firms 
acquiring private targets.  The hubris proxy must control for this effect.  So, our proxy, called the 
hubris index hereafter, is obtained using the following procedure: 
- for each CEO, the CAR is computed at the announcement of their first deal; 
- CEOs are split into two sub-samples, depending on the status of the target, public versus 
private, in their first acquisition; Npub and Npriv are the numbers of CEOs in the public target 
sub-sample and the private target sub-sample, respectively; 
- for each sub-sample, CEOs are ranked in decreasing order by the first deal CAR (ri denotes the 
rank of the ith CEO); 
- the hubris proxy, hi, is then the CEO rank divided by the total number of CEOs in the sub-
sample; i.e., pubii Nrh   or privii Nrh  . 
 
The higher hi, the lower the value of the CEO‟s first deal, hence the more likely the CEO is 
infected by hubris. While indirect and noisy, this proxy has several advantages. It is directly 
motivated by the ADR model.  Since it is based on ranks, it is robust to outliers.  Being computed 
by sub-samples of target status, it controls for that important determinant of acquirers‟ CAR.  
 
Let us also note that: 
- When the ‘Full Sample’ is split between rational and hubris-infected CEOs (mainly for 
univariate analyses), we define a dummy variable taking the value 1.0 if hi is above 0.75. The 
0.75 threshold is chosen to assure that CEOs classified as hubris-infected actually destroyed 
value in their first deal (they experienced a negative CAR). 
- Since the first deal CAR is used to determine hi (or its dummy version), that CAR is excluded 
from other calculations.  For example, trends in CAR and TBD start from the second deal (see 
Section III). 
 
Empirical Validation. The hubris index plays a key role in testing the ADR model‟s implications 
and its underlying learning hypothesis.  In an attempt to investigate whether this proxy is 
effectively correlated with CEO over-confidence and/or over-optimism, we have analyzed their 
insider trading activities. (Doukas and Petmezas (forthcoming European Financial Management) 
follow a comparable strategy using UK data.)  
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The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Ownership Reporting System (ORS) contains 
corporate insider purchases and sales.  On SEC Form 4, the ORS system includes security 
transactions by persons with beneficial ownership, primarily officers, directors and principal 
stockholders of a corporation.  Following Lakonishok and Lee (2001), the following records were 
discarded: duplicated, amended, with no price information, with a recorded date preceding the 
transaction date, with a recorded date 31 days (or more) after the due date.  We then identified 
acquirers that undertook insider trades during the three months preceding the announcement date 
of the first deal in an M&A program.  The ORS database does not identify the insider trading but 
only the firm within which he is working.  However the ORS database provides a classification: 
top executives, officers and directors.  Out of our 1424 CEO-firms that made at least one 
acquisition during the period 1992-2002 (our full-sample), we have been able to identify 465 
firms from with insiders who traded during the three months preceding the first deal 
announcement.   
 
The results are as follows.  For firms managed by CEOs classified as rational by the dummy 
variable version of our hubris index, the average net number of trades (buys minus sells) by 
insiders in the 3-month preceding the first deal announcement is -1.5 (or -$9,266,596 in sale 
proceeds on average.)  For firms managed by CEOs classified as hubris-infected, the average net 
number of trades is -1.12 (-$2,873,690 in average sale proceeds.)  For top executives only, the 
corresponding numbers are -0.29 by insiders of firms managed by rational CEOs (-$5,990,265) 
and -0.20 by insiders of firms managed by hubris-infected CEOs (-$1,453,174.)   
 
Probably for diversification reasons, insiders are on average net sellers (see Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001; Jenter, 2005).  The ratio of rational CEOs‟ net trades to hubris-infected CEOs‟ net trades is 
1.34 (-1.5/-1.12). In sales proceeds, the ratio is 3.32 (-$9,266,596/-$2,873.690). Insiders of firms 
managed by hubris-infected CEOs sell considerably less than their counterparts from firms 
managed by rational CEOs.  Limiting attention to top executives activities only, the results are 
even stronger; the number of trades ratio is 1.46 (-0.29/-0.20) and the sales proceeds ratio is 4.12 
(-5,990,265/-1,453,174).  Hence, the hubris index seems to capture a real difference in perceived 
future prospects by insiders and the effect is more pronounced for insiders close to the CEO.  
Although hubris-infected CEOs by construction (of the index) destroy value at the first 
acquisition, insiders of their firms are more bullish.  
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Finally, we have verified that the hubris index does not have a systematic time trend during the 
1992-2002 sample period.  
C.4. Financial Ratios, Outliers and Statistical Tests 
Financial ratios frequently exhibit large outliers (especially when the book value of equities is the 
denominator).  Moreover, controlling for industry is often essential (e.g., for debt and leverage 
ratios – see MacKay and Phillips (2005)).  To mitigate these potential difficulties, we discard any 
ratio whose denominator is a negative book value of equities and any ratio more than two 
standard deviations from the mean.  In the multivariate analyses, we use industry median adjusted 
values. 
 
All reported p-values are from a bootstrap procedure. We use a percentile-t approach, based on 
case by case resampling (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993), which is known to converge fast 
(Horowitz, 2002) and should perform well in small sub-samples. 
 
C.5. The Acquisition Program Effect 
Schipper and Thomson (1983) found that initial announcements of acquisition programs generate 
higher CARs then successive deal announcements; hence, we control for an acquisition program 
effect by including a dummy variable taking the value 1.0 if no deal has been announced by the 
firm in the two previous years.   
III. Univariate Analyses 
Our univariate analyses are presented in two tables. Table 3 focuses on the evolution of bidder 
(CEO and firm) and deal characteristics through M&A programs.  Table 4 is dedicated to the 
CAR and TBD.
11
  The univariate analysis extends through as many as seven acquisitions. This 
provides conformity with the later multivariate analyses (Section IV).  As shown in Table 2, 
sample sizes become quite small after seven acquisitions and are insufficient for most 
multivariate tests.  When interpreting univariate results, one should be mindful of the cross-
sectional and the time series dimensions of the observations.  For example, a negative trend in a 
                                                   
11To miminize the impact of outliers, Table 4 reports median values of CAR and TBD from deal to deal; 
Though it turns out that sample means have similar patterns (not reported.) 
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given ratio from deal to deal might be due to a general trend characterizing all CEOs or to a 
difference between CEOs doing few and many deals (or to both).  The issue is resolved with the 
panel data analyses in Section IV.   
 
To summarize the key results succinctly, we report the slope coefficient of each variable 
calculated in a pooled regression of the variable on the deal sequence number (SEQ).  This slope 
coefficients measures the average linear trend through a succession of deals. 
A. Bidder and Deal Characteristics from Deal to Deal 
Table 3 – Panel A shows that CEO base salary increases significantly from deal to deal (a result 
also reported by Datta et al. (2001) and Rosen (2004)). This is, perhaps, simply the usual relation 
between CEO salary and firm size but it might also reveal that CEOs who survive to consummate 
more deals have done more successful deals and are rewarded. There is no significant increase in 
the CEOs variable compensation components (Interest and Holding).  But since these are scaled 
either by total compensation or by company size there could still be a significant increase in the 
dollar value of variable remuneration.  Industry concentration measures do not display a 
systematic trend. The number and value of deals done in the bidder‟s industry increase.  This 
might be due to the late-1990s merger wave. Later deals, (higher SEQs), are more likely to have 
taken place later in the sample. The acquirer segment concentrations decrease and the number of 
segments increases, which clearly indicates that repetitive acquirers tend to diversify their 
activities. The increase in total assets is intuitively plausible.  The asset and sales based growth 
rates indicate that size increases at an increasing rate but the effect is only marginally significant 
for sales. Understandably, acquirer liquidity decreases; evidently, purchasing targets uses up 
some current assets such as cash. 
 
Table 3, Panel B describes the evolution of deal features. The percentage acquired increases 
significantly (from 89% to more than 95%) and so does the deal size, almost doubling on average.  
This is consistent with learning: CEOs could begin with smaller deals to learn the basics and then, 
when feeling more knowledgeable, they might risk bigger acquisitions (a practice stressed in the 
management literature (Harding and Rovit, 2004). The number of rivals significantly decreases: 
CEOs seems to be more and more able to deter competition (or else bigger deals attract fewer 
competitors); the effect is statistically significant but very small.  
B. Acquirer CAR from Deal to Deal 
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The four left-most columns of Table 4 report the behavior of acquirer‟s CARs. Panel A gives 
results for the ‘Full Sample’.  The CAR slope is negative and (marginally) significant, as reported 
in previous papers cited earlier. The ‘Big Sample’ results, presented in Panel B, show a similar 
pattern, though the negative slope appears to be more significant, particularly taking into account 
the very small number of observations at the end of the deal sequence.  
 
Are the CAR slopes different between rational and hubris-infected CEOs? Panel C of Table 4 
explores this issue. For rational CEOs, the slope is negative and clearly significant. For hubris-
infected CEOs, the slope is positive but not significantly different from zero.  Recall that the 
ADR model predicts a negative slope for rational CEOs and positive slope for hubris-infected 
CEOs. Given the noisy hubris proxy, this result is somewhat supportive.  Remember too that the 
first deal in the sequence is not included in this comparison. Is the difference of slopes 
significant? Is it robust to the inclusion of control variables and potential sample selection biases? 
The multivariate analyses in Section IV will offer an answer these questions.  
C. TBD, the time between deals 
The right-most columns of Table 4 present univariate results about TBD, which is clearly and 
strongly decreasing across deals. In Panel A, for the ‘Full Sample’, the median TBD between two 
deals goes from 426 days (between the CEO hiring date and his first deal) to 78 (between the 6th 
and 7th deals).  In other words, near the end of an acquisition program, CEOs are doing deals 
roughly five times faster than at the beginning of the program.  The negative slope is highly 
significant.  The same result is confirmed in Panel B for the ‘Big Sample’,. Panel C focuses on 
rational CEOs and hubris-infected CEOs.  The slope coefficient seems to be marginally less 
negative (by a factor of 10%) for the latter.  The ADR model predicts a negative slope for rational 
CEOs and positive slope for hubris-infected CEOs. Taking into account the noisy nature of the 
hubris proxy, two conclusions seem justified: 
- the TBD decrease for rational CEOs supports directly the learning hypothesis; 
- the difference of slopes between rational CEOs and hubris-infected CEOs may or may not 
provide indirect support for the learning hypothesis, depending on its statistical significance. 
We test this further in Section IV. 
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D. Listed Target CARs 
Listed targets are included in the data sample, so their CARs can be tracked from deal to deal. 
However, during a succession of acquisitions, a given acquirer typically mixes private and public 
targets, so there are gaps in the observable deal sequence targets. Keeping this limitation in mind,  
target CARs do not decline (middle columns of Table 4, Panels A and B).  This offers little 
support to the idea that the acquirers‟ decreasing CAR is driven by a shrinking investment 
opportunity set. 
 
From the results thus far, it appears that the ‘Full Sample’ and the ‘Big Sample’ are comparable. 
Consequently, for parsimony we present henceforth only results for the ‘Full Sample’, which has 
the advantage of larger sample sizes.  Also, since initially doing small deals may be a way to 
learn, excluding them might results in the loss of pertinent information. 
 
IV. Multivariate Analyses 
This section analyses multiple determinants of the CAR and the TBD, emphasizing the role of the 
deal sequence number.  
A. The CAR from Deal to Deal 
A.1. Econometric Methods 
A multivariate explanation of the CAR raises several econometric challenges. CARs are quite 
noisy (the typical R
2
 of CAR regressions range from less than 1% to 6 or 7% (see, e.g., Moeller et 
al., 2005). One must also consider the panel structure of the data and the potential endogenous 
sample selection biases pointed out in Section I.B.  Panels A to C of Table 5 progressively tackle 
these problems.  
 
Panel A of Table 5 presents a simple regression of the CAR on the deal sequence number; Panel 
B, after having conducted a Hausman specification test (the results of which are reported at the 
end of the Panel), presents corresponding results using a fixed panel data estimator; Panel C 
controls for both panel data and for the potential sample selection biases using a two-step 
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instrumental variable approach suggested in Wooldridge (2001).
12
 In this case, we first use a 
Probit to construct an instrument for the probability of being included in the sample. The Probit 
model is used only to control for endogenous sample selection, so it‟s specification is not 
interesting in itself.  The objective is to construct an instrument that is highly correlated with the 
probability of being included in the sample.
13
  The Probit model is re-estimated from deal to deal. 
The probability of inclusion is then used to compute the Heckman lambda, which is included in 
the CAR regression.  The CAR regression is calculated after first differencing in order to obtain 
the fixed effects estimator.  
A.2. Results 
The Panel A results conflict with the previously-reported univariate CAR results (see Table 4); in 
that the deal sequence number coefficient is insignificantly different from zero.  This shows that 
the inclusion of control variables strongly affects the univariate evidence.  This is confirmed in 
Panel B, using the fixed effects panel data estimator and in Panel C, using the Heckman two step 
estimator to control for potential endogenous sample selection.  Unreported results shows that the 
inclusion of any one of the following control variables is sufficient to remove the statistical 
significance of the CAR trend: Acquirer Market Value, Acquirer Industry Adjusted Tobin’s q, 
Acquirer Industry Adjusted Free Cash-Flow, Acquirer Industry Adjusted Leverage, Acquirer 
Industry Adjusted Price Earning, Acquirer Industry Adjusted ROE, Acquirer Long Term Past 
CAR, Acquirer Segment Concentration and the Acquisition Program Dummy.  The last variable is 
particularly worthy of noting; taking account of an acquisition program is sufficient to remove a 
negative CAR trend.  The clear message sent by Panels A, B and C is that the CAR‟s negative 
trend from deal to deal, when estimated with all CEOs jointly, is a byproduct of the changing 
sample of CEOs, firms and deals characteristics in successive acquisitions.  
 
Some comments about several of the control variables: 
                                                   
12We use the approach described in Woolridge‟s Section 17.7.3, which deals with endogenous attrition. 
13Variables included in the Probit are Gender, Salary, Interest, Acquirer Market Value, Number of deals 
already done by the firm, Number of segments, Industry Sales Based HHI, Industry Value of Deals (year-
1), Leverage, Tobin’s q, Industry Total Assets, Industry Cash Flow, Industry Sales Based Growth Rate, 
Industry Leverage, Industry Market to Book, Industry Tobin’s q. Some of these variables are clearly 
correlated (e.g, Industry Tobin’q and Industry Market to Book) but their simultaneous inclusion 
significantly improves the Probit fit. We have tested an alternative specification using six less colinear 
variables (Gender, Salary, Interest, Number of deals already done by the firm, Number of segments and 
Acquirer Market Value) and the results are qualitatively similar, except that the Probit fit is worse, raising 
concerns about potential weak instruments. 
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- only one control variable is statistically significant with a stable coefficient in Panels A, B and 
C: the runup (the anticipation effect observed in the 30 days preceding the event window, 
which has a negative effect, as expected); 
- one control variable is significant in Panels A, B and C but changes sign between Panel A and 
Panels B and C: the Acquirer Long Term Past CAR.  For the pooled analysis, it has a positive 
sign, which switches to negative with fixed effects estimation. The fixed effects estimators 
(Panels B and C) are essentially determined by the time series pattern.  A negative sign means 
that high past performing acquirers create less value in successive deals (and vice-versa). This 
is reminiscent of mean reversion.  When taking into account the cross-sectional dimension 
(with pooled estimation – Panel A), the coefficient becomes positive. Despite the mean 
reversion, high past performers, on average, undertake better acquisitions than low past 
performing acquirers. This is reminiscent of momentum. Overall, these results illustrate the 
importance of accounting for the panel data nature of repetitive acquisitions; 
- the fixed effects estimator (Panel B) confirms other results (obtained in the cross-section): past 
good performers create less value (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), deals realized by bidders from 
active industries (Industry Number of Deals) are more value creating, cash deals create more 
value (Travlos, 1987) and higher anticipations (runup) reduce the observed CAR around the 
announcement date (Van Bommel, 2003).  
- notice also that, in Panel C, the Heckman Lambda variable, which controls for the potential 
sample attrition bias, is not significant. Endogenous sample selection seems not to be a major 
concern here (except for the deal sequence number‟s significance). One possibility is that the 
winner’s curse and survival biases14 cancel each other out.  
 
Table 5 – Panel D explores the effects of hubris on sequential CARs while controlling for both  
panel data and potential endogenous sample selection (by using a two-step Heckman Panel Data 
estimator). The first two columns use the hubris index dummy variable and the last two use the 
hubris index rank based variable (see Section III.C).  The cross-product between deal sequence 
number variable and Hubris Index is added as an additional explanatory variable; the interaction 
coefficient should deliver information about the effect of hubris on the CAR slope across deals, a 
direct test of the ADR model‟s implications.  
 
                                                   
14As mentioned in Section I, corporate governance mechanisms could create a survival biases; i.e., later 
acquisitions in a sequence are done only by the sub-sample of CEOs who were not fired for bad 
performance in earlier acquisitions. 
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The interaction coefficient, between deal sequence number and hubris, turns out to be positive 
and significant.  Note also that in every case, the value of this coefficient is higher than the 
absolute value of the deal sequence number‟s own coefficient.  This implies that, while average 
CARs are negatively trending for rational CEOs, they are positively trending for hubris-infected 
CEOs; the difference is statistically significant and is robust to the Hubris Index variable 
definition. This constitutes strong support the ADR model‟s predictions. Finally, most of the 
control variables identified as significant in Panel C (Acquirer’s Long Term Past CAR, Industry 
Number of Deals in Year minus one, Private Target, Cash Deal and Runup) retain their signs and 
statistical significance. 
B. TBD 
B.1. Econometric Methods 
The time between successive deals (TBD) is measured as the months elapsed between successive 
acquisitions.  Since TBD is strictly positive, it is what the econometrics literature calls a count 
data variable.  Hence, we adopt GMM estimation for panel data introduced in Windmeijer (2000, 
2006) to explore the behavior of TBD in a multivariate setting.
15
   Concerning inference, 
unreported results (using, among others, a negative binomial model) indicates that we are faced 
with an over-dispersion problem,
16
 so even though the GMM estimator should be robust to this 
problem, for prudence‟s sake we compute p-values with a bootstrap.17  
 
Finally, we do not think it‟s necessary to control for endogenous sample selection biases when 
studying TBD.  While the CAR is determined in a market process involving investors, potentially 
leading to endogenous sample attrition, TBD depends entirely on CEO decisions, so there is little 
reason to suspect endogeneity. 
B.2. Results 
                                                   
15 We used the ExpEnd Gauss program for non-linear GMM Estimation of Exponential models (see 
Romeu, 2004.) 
16 The Poisson estimator is most frequently  used in count data models.  It relies on an assumption that the 
expected number of counts is equal to the variance of the number of counts.  When the variance is higher 
than the expectation, the econometric literature speaks about over-dispersion. Using a negative binomial 
model is a way to check for over-dispersion. 
17Inferences drawn using bootstrap p-values are qualitatively the same as those obtained using the 
asymptotic p-values provided by the ExpEnd Gauss program for the main variables of interests. But some 
control variables are more significant according to bootstrap p-values than according to their asymptotic 
counterparts. 
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Table 6 – Panels A and B present the results using the pooled estimator and the fixed effects 
estimator. In each case, the deal sequence number coefficient is negative and strongly significant. 
This confirms the univariate results (Section III.C): the average delay between successive 
acquisitions is strongly decreasing. Five control variables are consistently significant and they 
have the same sign with both estimators:  
- bidders with high industry adjusted returns on equity undertake acquisitions at a slower rate, 
suggesting that profitable companies study acquisitions more carefully; 
- higher acquirer industry concentration (measured by Industry Assets Based HHI), is associated 
with less delay, suggesting that repetitive acquirers in concentrated industries are in a hurry to 
buy remaining targets;  
- higher CEO base salary is related to longer the time between successive acquisitions, which is 
understandable for risk averse CEOs; 
- the significant positive coefficient of Acquisition Program (Dummy variable: 1 for Bidders 
having made any acquisitions the previous 24 months, 0 otherwise) reveals that CEOs hired by 
a firm having done deals in the past two last years do deals more slowly as compared to CEOs 
hired by companies that have not done a deal in the previous 2-years; (keep in mind that TBD 
for the first deal the time between the CEO‟s hire date and the first deal announcement date);  
- the positive coefficient of the Hostility variable indicates that CEOs take more time to prepare 
and announce hostile deals. 
 
Several control variables are significant in the pooled specification (Panel A) but not with fixed 
effects estimation (Panel B): Acquirer Market Value, Free Cash Flow – Industry Adjusted, the 
Long Term Past CAR, Segment Concentration, Industry Number of Deals (year-1), Interest, Cash 
and Runup. This reveals that their seeming significance is driven by a change in the cross-section 
of CEOs and not by the time-series dynamic of a given CEO.  Hence they have little relevance for 
our main topic of interest, the evolution of the CEO decisions in sequential deals during an M&A 
program.   
 
Tobin’s q – Industry adjusted is significant in both panels but changes sign. In Panel A, which 
relies on the cross-section only, the coefficient is positive: higher growth opportunities are 
associated with slower acquisitions.  However, the time series of the acquirer behavior in Panel B 
brings a sign reversal.  One possible explanation is that Tobin‟s q proxies for past performance of 
the firm. The negative sign might indicate that a good past performance tempts a CEO to 
accelerate further acquisitions. 
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Two variables are significant using the fixed effects estimator (Panel B) and not the pooled 
estimator (Panel A): Leverage – Industry adjusted and Private Target.  Since they are only 
significant when using the time-series property of the data, they probably reveal something 
specific about the dynamics of CEO decisions.  In particular, it seems quite plausible that an 
increase in leverage would reduce the speed at which CEOs are willing engage in takeovers.  The 
positive coefficient for Private Target is less intuitive.  Since public targets are better known, 
perhaps there is more competition among acquirers, thus hastening takeover decisions.  Perhaps 
CEOs have more leisure to consider private targets since other firms might be unaware of the 
potential synergies. 
 
Differences between rational CEOs and hubris-infected CEOs are explored in Panels C and D of 
Table 6, using the same method as in Table 5, (GMM estimation to accommodate panel data.)  
The only difference between Panels C and Panel D is the exclusion of the Salary and Interest 
control variables in the latter.  
 
Panel C shows that, for rational CEOs, the deal sequence number is negative and significant. The  
cross-product variable is positive and significant with both Hubris specifications. Hubris-infected 
CEOs accelerate less than rational CEOs during the M&A program implementation. But, in 
absolute value, the coefficient of the cross-product variable is significantly lower than the 
coefficient of the Deal sequence number variable.  Consequently, these results offer only partial 
support for the ADR model‟s predictions: there is indeed a behavioral difference between rational 
and hubris-infected CEOs but the difference is not large enough to generate an increasing TBD 
trend among hubris-infected CEOs.  Again, however, one might consider the influence of 
measurement error in the hubris index, as discussed in Section I.B.  By construction, the 
“rational” CEOs sub-sample likely includes some who are hubris-infected, those who overbid in 
their first acquisition and are disappointed by the resulting synergies, which are nonetheless large 
enough to deliver a positive CAR.  Given this unavoidable problem, partial empirical support of 
the ADR predictions about TBD is not all that surprising.  
 
Panel D of Table 6 uncovers an interesting interaction between CEO remuneration and CEO 
learning.  Removing the CEO compensation variables Salary and Interest increases the 
coefficient of Deal sequence number X Hubris and reduces the coefficient of the Deal sequence 
number alone, so that they become roughly comparable in magnitude. In words, the TBD trend 
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becomes almost flat for hubris-infected CEOs. This result suggests a potential interaction 
between a CEO‟s learning and his remuneration contract (see Rosen, 2004).  Since the effect of 
learning (a reduced TBD slope for hubris-infected CEOs) seems to be more pronounced when 
there is no control for remuneration, learning may be partly driven by the CEO‟s wage contract 
incentives.  Such a tentative interpretation clearly deserves further investigation. 
V. Conclusion 
Toward the end of the 1990s M&A wave, the aggregate deal value of year 2000 acquisitions 
initiated by US bidders reached $1.1 Trillion.  With a NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ total market 
capitalization around $15.5 Trillion at the end of the same year, acquisitions amounted to roughly 
7% of total market capitalization.  Might such a huge economic restructuring process be led by 
hubris-infected CEOs, as suggested by recent empirical evidence? Fuller et al. (2002), Croci 
(2005), Billett and Qian (2005), Conn et al. (2005), Ismail (2006) and Ahern (2006) find a clear 
declining trend in bidders‟ CARs over sequential acquisitions by the same CEO.  Some of these 
authors suggest that hubris is an explanation.  Are typical US CEOs infected by hubris?  The 
question is important, not only because of the potential to reduce resource allocation efficiency 
through acquisitions but how could corporate governance mechanisms offer such inadequate 
protection against value destruction?  Why would important economic decision makers be so 
prone to irrationality?  Yet the facts are incontrovertible: bidders‟ CARs do decline from deal to 
deal; we confirm this empirically and find no reason to suspect weaknesses in the earlier papers).  
 
Is there an alternative explanation of the unambiguous empirical evidence? Aktas et al. (2006) 
(ADR) model the CEO M&A decision making process theoretically. Combining rationality, 
hubris, and learning, they reach several testable conclusions. If rational CEOs are learning, which 
seems plausible, they become more aggressive with experience in bidding. Consequently, in 
successive acquisitions, they concede an ever larger fraction of synergies to target shareholders; 
this implies that bidder CARs should decline from deal to deal.  Hubris-infected CEOs, however, 
receiving negative feedback from investors about their excessive previous bids, become more 
cautious. This suggests an increasing trend in their CARs from deal to deal.  As rational CEOs 
become more aggressive in bidding, the probability of takeover success increases and the elapsed 
time between acquisitions decreases. The reverse should be expected for hubris-infected CEOs.  
 
Using information provided by Compustat ExecuComp, we study the behavior of 2,589 
individual CEOs during the 1992-2002 period. The Thomson SDC database identifies 4,677 
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acquisitions made by 1,424 of them.  A proxy for hubris is constructed.  It is based on the CAR 
observed around the very first acquisition made by a particular CEO and is supported by the 
pattern of insider trading activities. Key results are: 
- on average, observed CARs indeed decline from deal to deal. But the cross-sectional 
characteristics of bidders, CEOs and deals change within the sample of all acquisitions. So the 
CARs observed for, say, the fourth acquisition made by all CEOs who do four acquisitions, is 
not from the same population as the CARs from the third acquisition; 
- for rational CEOs, CARs decrease in successive acquisitions and the trend is statistically 
significant. For hubris-infected CEOs, CARs increase and the difference in trends between 
rational and hubris-infected is statistically significant. This result is consistent with the 
predictions of the ADR model; 
- endogenous sample selection biases can be controlled with a two-step Heckman procedure but 
they do not appear to represent a material problem since the results are similar to those obtained 
with simpler methods.   
- on average, the interval between successive acquisitions declines over time, as predicted by the 
ADR model for  rational CEOs who learn. This pattern is more pronounced for rational CEOs 
than for hubris-infected CEOs and the difference is statistically significant.  Taking into 
account the noisy nature of any hubris proxy including the one use in this paper (an errors-in-
variable issue pointed out in Aktas et al. (2006)), we feel it reasonable to conclude that hubris-
infected CEOs also learn, but at a slower pace. 
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Appendix 
Variable Description 
Panel A. Key variables 
CAR 
Bidder's announcement 11-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the 
announcement day. The abnormal return is calculated using the Beta-one model, which 
subtracts the daily market portfolio return (equal weighted CRSP index) from the daily 
return of the bidder. 
TBD 
For the first deal, the Time Between successive Deals is number of months between the 
CEO hiring date and the first acquisition announcement date. For subsequent deals, it is 
the number of months between successive acquisitions. 
SEQ The deal sequence number in the M&A program for a given CEO-firm couple.  
Hubris Score - Rank 
It corresponds to the hubris proxy (hi) computed using the rank method described in 
Section II.C.3. The higher hi, the more likely the CEO is hubris-infected.  
Hubris Score - 25% 
It corresponds to the dummy version of the hubris proxy; one if the hubris proxy hi is 
above 0.75, and zero otherwise. 
Lambda 
It corresponds to the Heckman lambda, obtained from a Probit model of the probability 
of being included in the CEO-firm sample.  
Panel B. CEO characteristics (Source: ExecuComp) 
Salary The dollar value of the base salary earned by the CEO during the fiscal year. 
Interest 
The variable component of CEO compensation. It corresponds to the sum of the 
aggregate value of stock options (BLK_VALUE) and the value of restricted stock 
(RSTKGRNT) granted to the CEO, divided by total compensation (TDC2). 
Holding The aggregate number of shares held by the CEO as a % of the total shares outstanding.  
Age The age of the CEO at the hiring date. 
Gender Dummy variable: 1 for male CEOs, and 0 for female CEOs.  
Panel C. Firm characteristics (Sources: CRSP, Compustat, Compustat Segment Database and ExecuComp) 
Long Term Past CAR 
24-month cumulative abnormal return (from month -27 to month -4, relative to the 
announcement date). 
Segment Concentration 
Concentration of activities computed using a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index on sales 
repartition by activity segments. 
Number of Segments The number of activity segments reported in the Compustat Segment database. 
Total Assets Log of book value of total assets (item 6). 
Cash Flow 
Income before extraordinary items (item 18)+depreciation and amortization (item 14), 
scaled by the book value of total assets (item 6).  
Free Cash Flow 
Operating income before depreciation (item 13)–interest expense (item 15)–income 
taxes (item 16)–capital expenditures (item 128), scaled by the book value of total assets 
(item 6). 
Asset Based Growth Rate 
Total Assets at the end of year t-1 minus Total Assets at the end of year t-2, scaled by 
the Total Assets at the end of year t-2. 
Sales Based Growth Rate 
Sales at the end of year t-1 minus Sales at the end of year t-2, scaled by the Sales at the 
end of year t-2. 
Leverage 
Book value of debt (item 34+item 9) over market value of total assets (item 6-item 
60+(item 25*Item 199)). 
Liquidity 
Current assets (item 4)-current liabilities (item 5), scaled by the book value of total 
assets (item6). 
Market to Book Market value of equity (item 24*item 25) divided by the book value of total common 
32 
 
equity (item 60). 
Price Earning 
Closing stock price at the end of the fiscal year (item 199) over earnings per share (item 
58). 
ROE 
Return on equity, which corresponds to the adjusted income before extraordinary items 
(item 20) over book value of total common equity (item 60). 
Tobin's q 
Market value of assets over book value of assets:  
(item 6-item 60+item 25*item 199)/item 6. 
Market Value 
Number of shares outstanding multiplied by the stock price one month prior to the 
announcement date. 
Acquisition Program  
Dummy variable: 1 for a Bidder having made no acquisitions in the past previous 24 
months, 0 otherwise. 
Runup 
Bidder‟s 30-day cumulative abnormal return during the period (-35,-6), relative to the 
announcement date. 
Number of deals already done 
by the firm 
The number of acquisitions done by the firm in the 2-year period preceding the CEO 
hiring date. 
Panel D. Bidder’s industry characteristics using the 48 Fama-French industry classifications  
Industry Assets Based HHI 
Industry Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration Index using total assets (item 6). The HHI 
is computed using all COMPUSTAT firms in the industry with valid data on total assets 
(item 6). 
Industry Market Value Based 
HHI 
Industry Herfindhal Index using market value of equities. 
Industry Sales Based HHI Industry Herfindhal Index using total sales. 
Industry Number of Deals 
(year -1) 
The number of deals in the bidder‟s industry the year before the deal announcement. 
Industry Value of Deals  
(year - 1) 
Aggregated value of deals in the bidder‟s industry the year before the deal 
announcement. 
Industry Total Assets Median total assets (log of book value) in the industry. 
Industry Cash Flow Median cash flow in the industry. 
Industry Debt Ratio Median debt ratio in the industry. 
Industry Sales Based Growth 
Rate 
Median sales based growth rate in the industry. 
Industry Leverage Median leverage in the industry. 
Industry Market to Book Median market to book ratio in the industry. 
Industry Tobin‟s q Median Tobin‟s q ratio in the industry. 
Panel E. Deal characteristics  
Toehold Percentage held by the bidder before the transaction.  
Percentage Acquired Percentage acquired by the bidder. 
Deal Size Size of the deal (in million USD). 
Target Size 
Estimate of the target size using ‘Deal Size’ and ‘Percentage Acquired’:  
Deal Size*(100%/Percentage Acquired). 
Number of Rival bidders Number of rival bidders reported by SDC. 
Hostility Dummy variable: 1 for hostile deals, 0 otherwise. 
Cash Dummy variable: 1 for purely cash-financed deals, 0 otherwise. 
Strategic Fit 
Dummy variable: 1 when the bidder and the target are from the same Fama-French 
industry, 0 otherwise. 
Private Target Dummy variable: 1 for private targets, 0 otherwise. 
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Figure 1. Aktas, de Bodt and Roll (2006) empirical predictions 
 
 
 
The X-axis represents the deal sequence number in an acquisition program undertaken by the same 
CEO. The Y-axis is either the ex-post observable CAR (Acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Return) or the 
TBD (Time Between Successive Deals). Panel A – left chart, considering rational CEOs, shows the 
declining pattern of ex-post observable CARs from deal to deal, as a consequence of the learning 
process. The associated right chart highlights the shortening TBD. Panels B and C, focusing on hubris 
infected CEOs, illustrate the opposite conclusion.  
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Table 1. CEO and M&A Sample 
Panel A reports active individual ‘CEO-firm’ couples by year. A ‘CEO-firm’ couple is a given individual CEO combined with a particular firm; (some CEOs have been active 
in more than one firm). Since the ExecuComp database starts in 1992, a full history of successive CEO decisions must be restricted to CEO hired after 1991. Panel B and C 
report the number of acquisitions and the aggregated deal value (US$ millions). Selection criteria are: US listed acquirers, completed deals, and percentage of shares held 
before the deal inferior to 50%. For ease of comparison with previous results, two samples are identified. The ‘Full Sample’ corresponds to all deals over one million US$, 
and the ‘Big Sample’ to deals over one hundred million US$. The total number of deals is 28,602 and 6,108 for the ‘Full Sample’ and the ‘Big Sample’, respectively. 
 
Panel A - Active CEOs by Year                     
Year     1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Count   159 377 605 837 1038 1223 1377 1565 1727 1803 1835 
%   1.3% 3.0% 4.8% 6.7% 8.3% 9.7% 11.0% 12.5% 13.8% 14.4% 14.6% 
              
Panel B - M&A Universe - Full Sample 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Count 956 1,001 1,340 1,753 2,254 2,358 2,902 3,687 3,723 2,932 2,564 1,686 1,506 
Value 77,209 71,611 88,903 163,021 204,955 318,233 437,631 659,575 1,197,734 1,029,969 1,112,749 535,033 263,412 
% 3.3% 3.5% 4.7% 6.1% 7.9% 8.2% 10.1% 12.9% 13.0% 10.2% 8.9% 5.9% 5.3% 
              
Panel C - M&A Universe - Big Sample                     
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Count 130 137 194 250 348 419 559 828 854 830 754 445 360 
Value 61,246 56,629 67,774 134,467 168,885 280,015 386,590 596,742 1,129,159 978,896 1,068,082 505,629 235,771 
% 2.1% 2.2% 3.2% 4.1% 5.7% 6.9% 9.2% 13.6% 14.0% 13.6% 12.3% 7.3% 5.9% 
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Table 2. Sample Characteristics 
Panel A displays summary statistics on acquisitions by CEO. The ‘Full sample’ corresponds to all 
deals over one million US$, and the ‘Big Sample’ to deals over one hundred million US$. The CEO 
sample encompasses 2,589 individuals active in 1,740 unique companies. The number of ‘CEO-Firm’ 
couples is 2,659. They were involved in 4,677 and 2,021 M&A deals, for the ‘Full sample’ and for the 
‘Big Sample’, respectively. The average number of deals by ‘CEO-Firm’ is 3.28 and 2.32 for the ‘Full 
sample’ and for the ‘Big Sample’, respectively. Panel B reports the number of CEOs having done at 
least a given number of deals. 
 
Panel A – Sample summary statistics   
  Full sample Big Sample 
 Number of CEOs 2,589 
 Number of Firms 1,740 
 Number of CEO-Firm Couples 2,659 
 CEO-Firm with no deal 1,235 1,787 
 CEO-Firm with at least one deal 1,424 872 
 Total number of deals 4,677 2,021 
 Average number of deal by CEO-Firm 3.28 2.32 
    
Panel B – Deals sequence statistics     
  Full sample Big Sample 
 1 deal 1,424 872 
 2 deals 515 455 
 3 deals 323 179 
 4 deals 193 99 
 5 deals 106 54 
 6 deals 78 30 
 7 deals 47 21 
 8 deals 45 6 
 9 deals 25 9 
  10 or more deals 91 18 
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Table 3. Bidder and Deal Profiles across Deal Sequence 
This table describes profiles of bidders (Panel A) and deals (Panel B) across the deal sequence for the ‘Full Sample’. Each cell contains the simple average. The deal 
sequence (SEQ), 0 to 7, indicates that acquirers in the cell have made exactly 0 to 7 acquisitions, respectively.  CEO and firm specific variables are from the year the CEO 
was hired, and then updated to values at the end of the year before each acquisition. ‘Slope’ corresponds to the slope coefficient of a regression between the variable and the 
deal sequence number. All ‘p-values’ are obtained using a bootstrap procedure. HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration Index. Variable definitions are in the 
Appendix. 
 
Panel A - Bidder characteristics - Full Sample 
 
 
SEQ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Slope p-value 
CEO Specific           
Salary 372 469 550 584 593 617 660 755 45.84074 0.00 
Interest 0.590 0.686 0.679 0.682 0.568 0.686 0.586 0.669 -0.00048 0.34 
Holding 1.26% 1.75% 0.92% 1.40% 1.61% 1.83% 0.71% 2.26% 0.00057 0.35 
Age 53.23 53.96 54.25 55.06 55.57 55.75 58.65 54.70 0.46131 0.26 
Gender 97.8% 97.7% 99.1% 99.0% 98.1% 98.7% 100.0% 100.0% 0.00298 0.01 
Firm Specific           
Long Term Past CAR  13.03% 24.73% 23.44% 35.42% 28.41% 22.18% 14.30% 8.27011 0.80 
Industry Assets Based HHI 0.104 0.104 0.109 0.098 0.094 0.077 0.104 0.103 -0.00136 0.17 
Industry Market Value Based HHI 0.120 0.126 0.130 0.131 0.121 0.120 0.122 0.129 0.00003 0.48 
Industry Sales Based HHI 0.087 0.092 0.095 0.089 0.090 0.074 0.090 0.090 -0.00064 0.15 
Industry Number of Deals (year -1) 104.6 117.3 129.9 148.6 126.1 161.8 161.5 147.0 7.03710 0.10 
Industry Value of Deals (year - 1) 22741.7 30702.6 27698.2 31360.7 32777.2 39080.9 46994.7 33886.2 2321.865 0.10 
Segment Concentration 0.794 0.796 0.771 0.796 0.787 0.736 0.731 0.663 -0.01612 0.00 
Number of Segments 2.201 2.213 2.310 2.272 2.453 2.514 2.564 2.923 0.09055 0.00 
Total Assets 6.818 6.979 7.224 7.301 7.337 7.436 7.741 8.264 0.17386 0.00 
Cash Flow 203.9 278.4 313.0 421.6 255.7 330.7 473.9 773.6 57.76525 0.20 
Free Cash Flow 0.015 0.031 0.035 0.044 0.040 0.031 0.023 0.057 0.00290 0.48 
Asset Based Growth Rate 0.173 0.182 0.192 0.256 0.188 0.287 0.248 0.373 0.02313 0.04 
Sales Based Growth Rate 0.171 0.169 0.185 0.245 0.199 0.302 0.195 0.312 0.01691 0.12 
Leverage 0.166 0.152 0.142 0.125 0.137 0.152 0.134 0.161 -0.00100 0.76 
Liquidity 0.227 0.243 0.215 0.216 0.235 0.189 0.180 0.179 -0.00852 0.00 
Market to Book 3.321 3.793 3.958 5.431 4.980 4.600 4.451 3.309 0.05572 0.86 
Price Earning 35.297 33.955 37.019 36.018 40.121 32.687 53.749 30.138 0.64240 0.32 
ROE 3.9% 9.5% 8.8% 15.7% 4.3% 1.5% 7.6% 13.1% 0.00256 0.75 
Tobin‟s q 1.971 2.128 2.177 2.591 2.448 2.319 2.292 2.060 0.02049 0.86 
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Table 3– Continued    
Panel B - Deal characteristics - Full Sample 
 
SEQ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Slope p-value 
Toehold  0.54 0.70 0.54 1.47 0.13 0.00 0.53 -0.0428 0.21 
Percentage Acquired  89.11 90.87 89.86 92.50 91.71 98.39 95.66 1.1586 0.00 
Deal Size  68.44 67.72 82.78 98.96 73.82 92.11 112.18 5.4644 0.00 
Number of Rival bidders  1.02 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 -0.0043 0.02 
Hostility  0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.9% 1.3% 2.1% 2.2% 0.0026 0.22 
Cash  56.1% 56.7% 56.0% 56.6% 43.6% 55.3% 57.8% -0.0037 0.31 
Strategic Fit  63.9% 58.2% 63.2% 65.1% 65.4% 72.3% 60.0% 0.0046 0.24 
Private Target  33.2% 34.4% 30.6% 36.8% 41.0% 29.8% 22.2% -0.0081 0.18 
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Table 4. CAR by Deal Sequence - Univariate Analyses 
This table describes, for the ‘Full Sample’ (Panel A) and the ‘Big Sample’ (Panel B), acquirers and listed 
targets‟ cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and time between successive deals (TBD) by deal sequence 
(SEQ). Deal sequence goes from 1 to 7. The ‘Full Sample’ corresponds to all deals over one million US$, 
and the ‘Big Sample’ to deals over one hundred million US$. Panel C analyses whether the slope of the 
CAR with respect to deal sequence is different between rational and hubris infected CEOs. Since the first 
deal CAR is used to build the hubris proxy, it is excluded. The hubris proxy is the dummy variable version 
of the hubris rank index defined in Section 2.C. Each panel provides the median of the CAR/TBD, the 
number of CEO-Firm couples in the sample (‘N’) and the „p-value’ to test whether the median is 
statistically different from zero. ‘Slope’ denotes the slope coefficient of the pooled regression between 
median CAR and the deal sequence number. All ‘p-values’ are obtained using a bootstrap procedure.  
 
Acquirer CAR Listed Target CAR TBD 
Panel A - Full Sample 
SEQ Median N p-value Median N p-value Median N p-value 
1 0.63% 1,388 0.00 15.68% 405  426 1424  
2 0.19% 900 0.06 19.23% 239  224 909  
3 0.47% 579 0.07 16.10% 173  204 586  
4 0.59% 390 0.08 19.40% 110  153 393  
5 -0.16% 285 0.22 17.66% 78  119 287  
6 0.63% 207 0.49 22.42% 52  104 209  
7 -0.99% 160 0.12 18.94% 37  78 162  
Slope -0.0016  0.11 0.0063  0.15 -30.40  0.00 
Panel B - Big Sample 
SEQ Median N p-value Median N p-value Median N p-value 
1 0.67% 855 0.00 18.12% 238  579 872  
2 -0.72% 413 0.23 20.75% 157  308 417  
3 0.27% 236 0.49 18.87% 108  238 238  
4 -0.97% 137 0.09 19.21% 67  150 139  
5 -1.38% 84 0.11 19.81% 50  140 85  
6 -0.01% 54 0.45 21.91% 38  121 55  
7 -1.61% 33 0.23 21.73% 28  100 34  
Slope -0.0025  0.07 0.0050  0.05 -40.10  0.00 
Panel C - Full Sample – Rational versus Hubris infected CEOs 
 Rational  Rational 
SEQ Median N p-value    Median N p-value 
1 / / /    / /  
2 0.29% 694 0.01    225 703  
3 0.44% 466 0.10    200 473  
4 0.70% 318 0.13    146 321  
5 -0.26% 231 0.20    111 233  
6 -0.36% 165 0.31    98 167  
7 -1.51% 130 0.14    77 131  
Slope -0.0035  0.03    -30.88  0.00 
 Hubris  Hubris 
SEQ Median N p-value    Median N p-value 
1 / / /    / /  
2 -0.67% 206 0.31    224 206  
3 1.30% 113 0.19    227 113  
4 -1.24% 72 0.21    170 72  
5 0.22% 54 0.43    170 54  
6 1.41% 42 0.13    143 42  
7 -0.58% 30 0.18    79 31  
Slope 0.0006  0.42    -27.9  0.00 
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Table 5. CAR by Deal Sequence - Multivariate Analyses 
Panel A presents pooled regressions of the CAR on the deal sequence number. Panel B estimates CAR determinants with a fixed panel data regression. Panel C presents 
results using a two-step Heckman Panel Data estimator. Panel D compares rational and hubris-infected CEOs using a two-step Heckman Panel Data estimator. The hubris 
proxy is either the dummy version or the hubris rank index defined in Section 2.C. ‘Coef’ corresponds to the estimated coefficient of the corresponding variable. „N’ denotes 
the number of ‘CEO-firm’ couples in the sample. ‘R²’ is the coefficient of determination. The ‘Fisher’ statistic and its corresponding ‘p-value’ are also provided for each 
regression. All ‘p-values’ are obtained using a bootstrap procedure. HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration Index. Variable definitions are in Appendix. 
 
 
Panel A 
Pooled Estimator 
Panel B 
Fixed Estimator 
Panel C 
Heckman Panel Data 
Panel D 
Hubris Dummy Hubris Score 
Independent Variable Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
Constant 0.0567 0.13         
Deal sequence number 0.0001 0.90 -0.0006 0.43 -0.0075 0.54 -0.0164 0.17 -0.0530 0.00 
Deal sequence number x Hubris Index       0.0414 0.00 0.0914 0.00 
Acquirer Market Value -0.0036 0.10 -0.0061 0.13 0.0000 0.97 0.0000 0.94 0.0000 0.73 
Tobin‟s q – Industry Adjusted 0.0021 0.46 0.0008 0.86 0.0017 0.80 0.0024 0.70 0.0031 0.62 
Free Cash Flow – Industry Adjusted -0.0120 0.78 -0.0092 0.94 -0.1073 0.31 -0.1046 0.31 -0.1121 0.29 
Leverage – Industry Adjusted -0.0043 0.82 0.0527 0.14 -0.0042 0.94 -0.0127 0.86 -0.0244 0.71 
Price Earning – Industry Adjusted [x102] -0.0063 0.11 0.0006 0.94 0.0031 0.76 0.0030 0.76 0.0002 0.99 
ROE – Industry Adjusted -0.0114 0.02 -0.0073 0.35 0.0300 0.31 0.0253 0.38 0.0216 0.45 
Long Term Past CAR 0.0070 0.03 -0.0107 0.02 -0.0254 0.00 -0.0240 0.00 -0.0235 0.00 
Segment Concentration 0.0016 0.89 0.0274 0.12 0.0371 0.13 0.0372 0.12 0.0328 0.16 
Industry Assets Based HHI 0.0292 0.23 0.0302 0.60 0.0027 0.97 0.0017 0.98 0.0121 0.88 
Industry Number of Deals (year-1) [x102] 0.0009 0.63 0.0015 0.04 0.0258 0.00 0.0283 0.00 0.0269 0.00 
Salary [x102] -0.0002 0.91 -0.0008 0.70 -0.0020 0.50 -0.0024 0.44 -0.0023 0.46 
Interest 0.0054 0.04 0.0005 0.91 0.0006 0.92 -0.0010 0.88 -0.0034 0.62 
Private Target  0.0064 0.32 0.0055 0.42 0.0132 0.00 0.0126 0.00 0.0125 0.00 
Cash 0.0074 0.24 0.0160 0.01 0.0117 0.07 0.0104 0.10 0.0108 0.08 
Acquisition Program 0.0100 0.25 0.0057 0.66 0.0007 0.94 0.0010 0.91 0.0016 0.86 
Number of rival bidders -0.0183 0.02 -0.0034 0.85 -0.0067 0.43 -0.0062 0.45 -0.0060 0.46 
Hostility 0.0144 0.54 0.0080 0.74 0.0275 0.39 0.0292 0.37 0.0282 0.38 
Runup -0.0400 0.01 -0.0527 0.00 -0.0649 0.00 -0.0611 0.00 -0.0597 0.00 
Strategic Fit 0.0012 0.78 -0.0015 0.77 -0.0048 0.42 -0.0064 0.28 -0.0055 0.35 
Lambda     0.0004 0.99 0.0023 0.89 0.0022 0.89 
N 2,872  2,872  1,323  1,323  1,323  
R² 1.90%  41.40%  4.30%  5.90%  7.80%  
Fisher 2.8 0.00 1.6 0.00 2.93 0.00 3.85 0.00 5.24 0.00 
 Hausman Test (Random vs Fixed Effect) 
  Chi2 33.48 0.03 
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Table 6. Time between successive deals (TBD) - Multivariate Analyses 
This table provides multivariate analyses of TBD (the time in months between successive acquisitions) for the ‘Full Sample’. Panel A reports GMM Pooled estimation. Panel 
B presents results from GMM Fixed Panel Data estimation.  Panels C and D investigate, using GMM Fixed Panel Data estimation, the differences between rational and 
hubris-infected CEOs. The hubris proxy is either the dummy version or the hubris rank index defined in Section 2.C.‘Coef’ denotes the estimated coefficient of the 
corresponding variable. ‘N’ is the number of CEO-firm couples in the sample. All ‘p-values’ are obtained using a bootstrap procedure.. HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman 
concentration Index. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 
Panel A 
Pooled Estimator 
Panel B 
Fixed Estimator 
Panel C Panel D 
Hubris Dummy Hubris Score Hubris Dummy Hubris Score 
Independent Variable Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value Coef p-value 
Constant 3.8389 0.00           
Deal sequence number -0.0665 0.00 -0.1285 0.00 -0.1357 0.00 -0.1709 0.00 -0.0623 0.00 -0.0968 0.00 
Deal sequence number x Hubris      0.0374 0.00 0.0873 0.00 0.0515 0.00 0.0923 0.00 
Target Size 0.0057 0.30 -0.0083 0.30 -0.0084 0.41 -0.0087 0.28 -0.0153 0.11 -0.0158 0.18 
Acquirer Market Value -0.1216 0.00 -0.0361 0.89 -0.0334 0.70 -0.0287 0.99 0.1173 0.00 0.1220 0.00 
Tobin‟s q – Industry Adjusted 0.0245 0.05 -0.0743 0.00 -0.0765 0.00 -0.0792 0.00 -0.1156 0.00 -0.1189 0.00 
Free Cash Flow – Industry Adjusted -0.3954 0.06 0.1444 0.60 0.2083 0.45 0.2012 0.53 0.6943 0.00 0.6793 0.00 
Leverage – Industry Adjusted -0.0226 0.72 0.7222 0.00 0.7155 0.00 0.6968 0.00 1.0532 0.00 1.0435 0.00 
Price Earning – Industry Adjusted [x102] 0.0004 0.14 0.0005 0.08 0.0006 0.06 0.0005 0.06 0.0008 0.00 0.0007 0.00 
ROE – Industry Adjusted 0.1753 0.01 0.1623 0.05 0.1624 0.01 0.1605 0.00 0.1268 0.09 0.1226 0.12 
Long Term Past CAR 0.0763 0.00 -0.0394 0.43 -0.0372 0.14 -0.0324 0.45 -0.0270 0.37 -0.0216 0.56 
Segment Concentration 0.1717 0.01 0.0239 0.91 0.0243 0.65 0.0211 0.92 -0.0737 0.08 -0.0762 0.25 
Industry Assets Based HHI -0.8336 0.00 -1.4194 0.00 -1.4209 0.00 -1.4148 0.00 -1.2091 0.00 -1.1918 0.00 
Industry Number of Deals (year-1) [x102] -0.0003 0.05 0.0001 0.75 0.0001 0.61 0.0001 0.80 -0.0003 0.05 -0.0003 0.03 
Salary [x102] 0.0007 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.0019 0.00 0.0019 0.00     
Interest -0.0721 0.00 -0.0513 0.22 -0.053 0.17 -0.0580 0.15     
Private Target  0.0074 0.74 0.0972 0.00 0.0977 0.00 0.0973 0.00 0.0800 0.00 0.0805 0.00 
Cash -0.0460 0.05 -0.0311 0.26 -0.0308 0.36 -0.0314 0.30 -0.0058 0.81 -0.0069 0.77 
Acquisition Program 1.0196 0.00 0.9293 0.00 0.9276 0.00 0.9291 0.00 0.9341 0.00 0.9369 0.00 
Number of rival bidders 0.0593 0.15 0.0132 0.79 0.0148 0.74 0.0160 0.77 0.0066 0.90 0.0071 0.87 
Hostility 0.1673 0.07 0.3213 0.00 0.3285 0.02 0.3230 0.00 0.3543 0.02 0.3482 0.03 
Runup 0.2614 0.00 0.1547 0.41 0.1559 0.30 0.1660 0.32 0.2870 0.00 0.2985 0.00 
Strategic Fit -0.0204 0.29 0.0090 0.77 0.0083 0.63 0.0103 0.73 -0.0138 0.60 -0.0113 0.70 
N 2.213  2.213  2.213  2.213  2.213  2.213  
 
